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# LUZON CAMPAIGN,

FROM FEBRUARY TO DECEMBER, 1899.

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FIRST SERIES.

IX.

April 22, 1901.

This Pamphlet may be obtained  
by application to L. K. Fuller,  
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*Philippine Information Society*  
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THE Philippine Information Society is preparing a series of publications in pursuance of the purpose for which the Society was formed, that, namely, of placing within reach of the American people the most reliable and authoritative evidence attainable in regard to the people of the Philippine Islands and our relations to them.

The whole of the evidence, even the whole of the official evidence, is more voluminous than a busy people can be expected to read. Some selection on our part has, therefore, been a necessary condition of the accomplishing of our object. This selection by us has, however, been confined, so far as possible, to the choosing of subjects to be dealt with. Upon each subject chosen we have given in some cases all the evidence obtainable, in all other cases as much of the important and authoritative evidence as is possible within reasonable limits, with ample references to the remainder. In these cases we have endeavored to include the evidence that is most authoritative and important.

If those of whatever shade of opinion who find our mediation unsatisfactory, or who are not convinced of our success in getting the whole story, will appeal from us to the original sources of information, our object of promoting a knowledge of the facts will be only the more effectively secured. We shall be grateful for any criticism or information convicting us of the omission of any important evidence, or of any appearance of unfairness in the presentation of evidence, and will endeavor to profit thereby in future editions.

The subject of the present series of papers has seemed to us as important as any that could be selected. It comprises the principal episodes in the history of our relation to the Filipinos, chiefly as that history is contained in our State papers. We have been careful to include the evidence which tells of the Filipinos' share in that history as well as our own. Whatever view one may hold as to the proper policy for us to pursue toward the Filipinos, it is evident that no policy can be intelligently chosen nor successfully carried out unless it is based upon an understanding of these people, and of their present attitude toward us, and toward the question of our relation to them. It is hoped that the account we shall offer may prove a help toward an understanding of the present situation.

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THE PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY.

OUTLINE OF FIRST SERIES.

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THE STORY OF THE FILIPINOS,

AS TOLD IN UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS AND OTHER AUTHENTIC PUBLICATIONS.

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I. José Rizal, the Filipino Patriot: together with an account of the Insurgent Movement of 1896.

II. Aguinaldo: a Selection from his Official Documents, together with the Authorized Accounts of the alleged "Spanish Bribe."

III. The Insurgent Government of 1898.

IV. Our Relations with the Insurgents prior to the Fall of Manila, August, 1898.

V. Aguinaldo and the American Generals, August, 1898, to January, 1899.

VI. Iloilo: An Episode of January, 1899, and Strained Relations in Manila.

VII. Outbreak of Hostilities, February 4, 1899.

VIII. Efforts to secure an Armistice, April and May, 1899.

IX. Luzon Campaign, from February to December, 1899.

X. Six Months of Guerilla Warfare.

XI. Present Condition and Attitude.

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NOTE. It will be impossible to bring out the circulars in their chronological order owing to the difficulty and delay in securing certain of the necessary official documents, some of which, indeed, are not yet in our hands. Every effort will be made, however, consistent with thoroughness and accuracy to issue them as soon as possible.



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at-line Map for Luzon Campaign of 1899.

LUZON CAMPAIGN,  
FROM FEBRUARY TO DECEMBER, 1899.

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INTRODUCTION.

No historian has yet told the story of the war between the United States and the Philippine insurgents. One can only obtain information on this subject by reading the records of the War Department, which give the daily communications between headquarters and subordinate officers.

The events of the first nine months alone are told in some 4000 pages of fine printing. It is not to be expected that many persons will have the leisure to study for themselves such a mass of material. We have, therefore, ventured to summarize in our own words the history of these first nine months, quoting directly whenever terse statements that would answer our purpose could be found in the reports.

The island of Luzon\*, the largest and most northern island in the archipelago, has always been the main theatre for the war. From the first, a few garrisoned posts in the other islands were held by our troops, chiefly for trade purposes; but for a long time the demand for every armed man in Luzon made anything like a control of the central and southern islands impossible. Affairs in these other islands will be described in a later pamphlet. In the present issue we have confined ourselves to a study of the Luzon campaign. As a key to the somewhat confusing material given in this pamphlet, a brief outline of the Luzon campaign may be of assistance.

Outline of Northern Campaign.

Manila, the chief city of Luzon, was in control of our troops, under the protocol with Spain, at the time of the outbreak of

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\* The area of Luzon is estimated by John Foreman at 40,000 square miles. The total area of the archipelago is approximately computed to be about 52,500 square miles.

hostilities, February 4, 1899. Almost six sevenths of the island is north of the city, which, combined with the fact that Malolos, the capital of the so-called insurgent government, was eighteen miles northeast of Manila, and that Aguinaldo held his headquarters there, made the northern district of chief importance for offensive warfare.

From the start, the idea was to get to the rear of the insurgent troops, making escape to the mountains impossible. The first attempt to execute this plan was made by General MacArthur in March, 1899. It was soon discovered, however, that a combined move was necessary, and the following month General Lawton was sent to General MacArthur's assistance. The approach of the rainy season and the difficulty of transportation made it necessary to abandon the attempt to surround the insurgent forces at this time.

In October of the same year came a more elaborate northward campaign. As a result of this movement the Filipino government was disrupted and the insurgent forces disintegrated. Our generals were unable, however, to prevent Aguinaldo's escape to the mountains.

#### Outline of Southern and Eastern Campaigns.

There seems to have been no definite plan of campaign for the eastern and southern districts. From time to time expeditions were sent east and south to drive back the insurgents from about Manila and, if possible, to open up trade with the southern provinces; but each expedition had to be recalled immediately in order to supply the need for men in the north. The net result of the southern operations was the control of the territory for ten miles south as a defense for Manila, and the occupation of two cities on the Laguna de Bay for trading purposes.

Twice during the period covered by this pamphlet the southern district was patrolled by our troops. Little opposi-

tion was encountered, the natives in the villages making many protestations of welcome to the Americans. However, these same villages at once passed back into the control of the insurgents after the departure of our troops. At the close of the year 1899 the insurgents still held intact their entire strength in the south.

### United States Troops in the Philippines.

The Eighth Army Corps in the Philippines, under command of Major-General E. S. Otis, consisted of the First and Second Divisions; at the time of the outbreak, February 4, 1899, the First Division was commanded by Major-General T. M. Anderson, and the Second Division by Major-General Arthur MacArthur.

On that date, the total force in the Philippines was 20,851. Of these, 14,000 were effective for duty. Re-enforcements received in May made the total force, on May 31, 34,227, with 25,809 effective for duty.

The volunteers returned to the United States during the summer were replaced for the most part by regulars, so that on August 31 the total force was 30,963, with 27,189 effective for duty. Of these, 24,000 were regulars.

In October the new volunteer organizations began to arrive, so that at the end of October the whole force was 35,683; at the end of November it was 40,863; and at the end of December, 1899, it was 51,167.

The casualties in killed and wounded, from February 4 to August 31, 1899, number 19 officers and 342 enlisted men who were killed, or who died of wounds received in battle, and 87 officers and 1325 enlisted men wounded.

The next period, for which casualties are given, is from August 31, 1899, to May 1, 1900. Therefore it is impossible to give the exact number of casualties during the period covered by this pamphlet.

## I. SPRING CAMPAIGN.

### Summary from February 4 to March 24.

The outbreak of hostilities February 4 has been so fully described in a preceding pamphlet (No. VII.) that no further mention of it is necessary here. During the remainder of February and the early part of March, Generals Anderson and MacArthur were engaged in placing the outer lines of Manila in a condition of defense so that they might be securely held by fewer troops. It was necessary to defend not only the city itself, but also the water supply, making in all a district of some nine miles that must be controlled before any extensive movement to the north or south could be initiated. Meanwhile the insurgents were concentrating to the north and somewhat to the south of Manila, collecting ammunition and establishing war depots. Lieutenant-General Luna boasted of an army 16,000 strong on MacArthur's front at the north. General Otis believed that this was an over-estimation, but, nevertheless, considered Luna's forces as our true objective, at that time.

### Northern Expedition of March.

The first northern campaign began March 24, under command of General MacArthur, whose instructions were to move in two columns one on either side of the enemy, meeting to the north of the concentrated insurgent troops, thus effectually cutting off their escape. "This matured plan," says General Otis,\* "failed in part owing to the natural obstacles which were constantly met on the line of march." General MacArthur says,† "The density of the jungle which prevented

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\* Otis Report for 1899, page 112.

† Report of Major-General commanding the Army for 1899, Part 3, page 382.

seeing any distance made it impossible to keep the troops together, and thereby embarrassed, impeded and at times entirely interrupted their movement. As a consequence it became apparent very early in the day that the purpose of striking the line of communication far enough to the rear to intercept the insurgent retreat was almost impossible of accomplishment."

The actual movements of the northern campaign were briefly as follows :

General MacArthur followed the railway line to Malolos, capturing the intervening towns. The insurgents fired all towns as they retreated, apparently in obedience to the following order issued by General Luna : \*

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" HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS  
AGAINST MANILA.

"I, Antonio Luna, general in chief of operations, ordain and command from this date forward :

"*First.* The following will be executed by shooting without court martial :

"A. Spies and those who give news of us to the enemy.

"B. Those who commit robberies and those who violate women.

"*Second.* All towns which may be abandoned by our forces will be burned down. No one deplures war more than I do ; I detest it ; but we have an inalienable right to defend our soil from falling into the hands of the fresh rulers who desire to appropriate it, slaughtering our men, women, and children.

"For this reason we are in duty bound as Filipinos to sacrifice everything for our independence, however great may be the sacrifices which the Fatherland requires of us.

"General headquarters at Polo, February 15, 1899.

"The general in chief of operations,

" A. LUNA."

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\* Report of Major-General commanding the Army, 1899, Part 3, page 385.

March 25th, the newspapers in the United States gave long accounts of MacArthur's proposed plan of action, together with the statement that General Otis had advised the War Department that the insurrection would soon be at an end. Maps were given illustrating the method by which the insurgents were to be hemmed in, and cordial praise was expressed for General Otis's splendid conception. Perhaps the consciousness of the interest aroused in this country by the publication of the plan for the campaign explains the words one finds in a despatch to General MacArthur, dated March 30th, "Washington watching eagerly. Must have no reverse now."\*

General MacArthur entered the insurgent capital Malolos March 31st, finding the city burned and all records and properties removed. General MacArthur was eager to proceed nothward at once along the line of the railroad to Tarlac in pursuit of the insurgents, who, he felt sure, were making their retreat in that direction. In reply to his request to be allowed to do so, General Otis said:

"Aguinaldo will never retreat in province of Tarlac. If forced strenuously he will retire along the edge of the province of Bulacan into Nueva Ecija, where Tagalos inhabit. This for political reasons. If you can secure coast base at Malolos and abandon railroad, you are in better strategic position, all things considered, than at Calumpit. Was informed several days ago that insurgents would retire on Baliuag, which is the intersection of several important roads connecting with nearly all the Tagalog country north of Manila. You are now defending long line of railroad and the movement of your column requires nearly half of the force of the army here and all of its transportation, while a large part of the insurgent forces is around Manila, which city must be kept down. No hasty movement from Malolos will be attempted, but careful reconnoissances will be made to-morrow morning to the east and north to discover where insurgent forces are, if possible."†

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\* Report of Major-General commanding the Army, 1899, Part 3, page 391.

† Ibid., page 395.



“It may be stated here as a matter of fact,” says General MacArthur,\* “that the insurgent army which retired from Caloocan and La Loma never departed from the railroad, and never sent detachments to the east or northeast from the railroad, but, on the other hand, ultimately received considerable reinforcements therefrom.”

Believing that a combined movement which should result in the hemming in of the insurgents would be more advisable than a pursuit of the retreating enemy, General Otis detained General MacArthur at Malolos, until communications between that city and Manila should be perfected, and until General Lawton could be sent north to aid in surrounding the insurrectionary forces.

#### Southern Expedition of March.

Meanwhile, on March 17, General Anderson had been relieved by General Lawton who had just arrived from New York. General Lawton was put in command of an expedition sent south to capture Santa Cruz and Calamba on the shores of Laguna de Bay, and locate and seize two insurgent launches.

Santa Cruz was the richest and most important city of La Laguna province, situated on a neck of land on the southeastern shore of Laguna de Bay, the outlet for the produce of the rich country to the south and southeast. The insurgents were reported to be established in full confidence there. The city was captured April 10th, the insurgents retreating with heavy loss under the combined fire of the land troops and the machine guns on our boats. Before Calamba could be taken, however, General Lawton was recalled by the following letter from General Otis: †

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\* Report of Major-General commanding the Army, 1899, Part 3, page 396.

† Ibid., page 58.

"Manila, P. I., April 15, 1899.

"MY DEAR GENERAL :

[*Summary of omitted portion* : Launches sent to bring back captured property.]

"I have been at a loss as to what definite instructions to give you, due to the fact of the existing necessity to strike a hard blow at the north very quickly and while we have the volunteers with us, and to the importance of permitting you to finish your mission in the bay. I have concluded that it is most essential for you to return your troops as soon as possible in order that all available organizations can operate in the north. We can work on the lake at any time, and much better, I think, during the rainy season when the water is high than now. I am afraid that you will not be able to get into Calamba at the present time without the greatest difficulty.

"You will therefore return with your troops as soon as you can consistently do so, and we will fix up for you a new point of departure. There has been an exchange of treaty ratifications and the newspapers report the fact that it has been duly proclaimed by the President. If the volunteers insist on going home, we shall soon be very weak again, and it will be two months before we can concentrate the regular regiments which have been designated to come to the Philippines; besides, about 2,000 men must be sent within a few days to Mindanao and the Jolo Archipelago. General MacArthur is having trouble on his line and the insurgents up there must be stirred up. Lieutenant Brooke, I think will be off in a couple of hours.

Very sincerely yours,

"E. S. OTIS.

"Major-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V.

"*Commanding Troops, Laguna de Bay.*"

General Lawton's retreat thus ordered occasioned great excitement among the insurgents in the north, who grew

bolder at once. The European Junta reported the affair as a victory for the Filipino arms. English papers commented upon the incident, as follows :\*

“LONDON, APRIL 19th. The morning papers all comment upon the situation in the Philippines to the general effect that it is now impossible for the United States to draw back, and that the Americans must, from time to time, expect such apparent reverses as Major-General Lawton’s retirement from the Santa Cruz district.”

General Otis, however, was not in the least discouraged. On April 19 he cabled to Washington as follows : †

“MANILA, APRIL 19. Lawton returned from Lake Country 17th inst. bringing captured vessels. Insurgents much scattered ; retreat before our forces ; await opportunity to attack detachments. Better class of people tired of war, desire peace. Enemy build hope on return of our volunteers to the United States. Its army much demoralized and loss by desertions and death large. Will probably prosecute guerilla warfare, looting and burning country which is occupied. Health and spirits of troops good. Volunteers’ return will begin about May 5th. Will render willing service until return transports available. Embarkation will continue through June and July. Reports from Visayan Islands continue very encouraging. Interisland commerce heavy ; custom receipts increasing.

“OTIS.”

On the following day this reassuring statement from the War Department ‡ was made public :

“WASHINGTON, APRIL 20th. It was announced positively at the War Department to-day that the provisional army of 35,000 volunteers authorized by the law will be called out only as a last resort. No such action is now in contemplation,

\* New York *Tribune*, April 19th.

† *Ibid.*, April 21st.

‡ *Ibid.*, April 20th.

and it will be avoided as long as possible. The hope is expressed that there will be no necessity for an increase beyond the present limit of 65,000, and officials are confident of their ability to subjugate the Filipinos with the troops now in the field, and reinforcements to be sent there from the Regular Army."

#### Northern Campaign of April and May.

As soon as General Lawton returned to Manila the second concerted move northward began with the same general plan outlined for MacArthur in March. This time General Lawton was to proceed northward to the east of General MacArthur's column, forming a junction with MacArthur's troops, to the north of the insurgent forces, when an attack could be made on all sides at once, and the enemy completely demoralized. General Lawton left Manila April 22, and on that same day MacArthur took up the advance northward from Malolos. On this expedition MacArthur got as far north as San Fernando, about 45 miles north of Manila on the main railway line, which city he captured. General Lawton moved first northeast, then westward to Baliuag, one of the chief war depots of the enemy, where he waited until General MacArthur should be enabled to secure a more advanced position and discover the whereabouts of the enemy. He was obliged to abandon the towns which he had captured farther to the east owing to the lack of men to garrison them.

The situation at this time was a trying one. General MacArthur reported from San Fernando that a great many of his troops were sick and needed to recuperate. General Luna was in his immediate front with 2500 men, and had 1000 more about five miles northeast of San Fernando. Between San Fernando and Baliuag where General Lawton was stationed MacArthur thought there were some 10,000 insurgents.

The United States force that occupied San Fernando consisted of an aggregate of something like 4,800 men, but on May 10, yielding only 2,640 infantry for duty on the firing line. These men had been on outpost duty for nearly 90 days, and those who were not actually on the sick list showed the effect of the prolonged strain. The chief surgeon reported that they would not be "fit for duty as a regiment within any reasonable period." \*

General Otis states : †

"There were no fresh troops to send to San Fernando. The withdrawal of the Spanish forces in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, where troops must be placed, the necessity of sending others to Cebu and to increase those in Negros — all of which was imperatively demanded at this time — rendered conditions somewhat critical. I had also been directed to return the volunteer organizations to the United States without delay, and in response I cabled on May 11 to Washington as follows :

"'Volunteer organizations first to return now at Negros and 45 miles from Manila at front. Expected that transports now arriving will take returning volunteers. Volunteers understand they will leave for United States latter part of month. Know importance of their presence here at this time, and accept sacrifices which United States interests make imperative. Hancock now entering harbor. Transports returning this week carry sick and wounded men. Pennsylvania and St. Paul not needed longer in southern waters where they have been retained, hence dispatched. Transports Nelson and Cleveland brought freight return without cargo.'

"This I did after consulting with some of the most prominent volunteer officers, pointing out to them the delicate situation we were in, and they responded that the volunteers would willingly remain until it was cleared up or until more of the regular regiments then en route could arrive. We must now either advance at the north or retreat to Calumpit,

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\* Otis Report for 1899, page 121. † Ibid., page 118.

holding the railroad in our rear and await reinforcements with which to replace all volunteers, having in the meantime a large insurgent force in our immediate front and a continually increasing one south of Manila, which had become annoying and which now numbered 5,000 men. It was therefore determined to direct MacArthur to hold on to San Fernando with what force he had, operating against and holding Luna as best he could; to send a detached column up the Rio Grande, and to permit Lawton to advance."

Accordingly on May 14 Lawton was ordered to proceed northward with San Isidro as his objective. San Isidro, a rich and strategically important town some 65 miles north of Manila, was captured May 17, after sharp resistance from the insurgents and gallant fighting on the part of our own men.

It was necessary however to abandon the preconceived plan of forming a junction with MacArthur's troops and cutting off the enemy on the north, owing to the heavy rains and the impossibility of forwarding supplies to General Lawton who was not on the railroad line. Accordingly General Lawton was recalled May 19. All the towns that he had captured with the exception of Baliuag, had to be abandoned. On the return march the troops encountered great difficulties from the steady downpour and the constant vexatious demonstrations from the enemy.

"They were attacked while en route," says General Otis,\* "at Ildefonso and Maasin, and were obliged to halt twice and drive off the enemy, which they did effectively, but the enemy published and celebrated for a long time their signal victories at Ildefonso, San Miguel and San Isidro."

The insurgents supposing a general retreat was intended were at once excited to great activity. "They forwarded their forces by rail to General MacArthur's front and concentrated near San Miguel." †

On May 24 they attacked an outpost on the right of San Fernando and were repulsed with heavy loss.

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\* Otis Report for 1899, page 122. † Ibid., page 134.

### Rumors of Need for Re-enforcements.

On May 31 the forces in the Philippines numbered 1,201 officers and 33,026 enlisted men. Of these an aggregate of 25,809 were effective for duty. The troops sent to other islands left in Luzon 20,965. Of the whole number present in the Philippines, 16,000 were volunteers waiting to be returned to the United States, leaving 18,000 regulars owing further service.

It was necessary to hold territory between Manila and San Fernando in order that communication with MacArthur might be possible. Our lines of communication were constantly attacked by the insurgents, and the necessity for defending them made offensive demonstration impossible.

At that time it was rumored in the United States that a large number of re-enforcements were to be sent to Manila. It was widely quoted in the newspapers that General Lawton had said an army of 100,000 men was needed in the Philippines.

All the rumors were denied, however, by the War Department. The following item in the *New York Tribune* of June 1 is an example of the reassuring comments of the press :

“ WASHINGTON, May 31.

“ The President to-day declared to a caller that there was not at present any intention of largely increasing General Otis's forces in the Philippines. He said that nothing had been received from General Otis which indicated the necessity for more troops beyond the Regulars who are to be sent to relieve the retiring volunteers. But the President added that if additional re-enforcements became necessary they would be promptly furnished. A number of Governors of States had advised him that they could furnish regiments in short order if occasion required. But at the same time the President expressed his strong belief and confidence that

necessity for mustering in additional volunteers in accordance with the authority granted by the Army Reorganization Bill would not arise.

“Secretary Alger was with the President for some time discussing the situation. When he left the White House he denied that General Otis had said yesterday that 30,000 troops would be necessary. General Otis, he said, had been informed from time to time that all the troops he considered necessary would be supplied to him, and not a word of complaint has come from him.

“‘This morning,’ the Secretary continued, ‘I cabled to General Otis giving him definite information as to the number of Regulars he would have after the volunteers are withdrawn. . . . We have absolutely no reason to believe that General Otis will request more troops than we can furnish without enlisting volunteers.’”

#### Insurgent Appeals for an Armistice.

Information gained in May indicated that Tarlac, a town about 30 miles north of San Fernando, was the new capital chosen by the insurgents. During April and May there were constant applications from the insurgents for a suspension of hostilities, and several commissions were passed through our lines to confer with the Schurman Commission. Nothing was gained by these conferences, as the insurgents asked only for an armistice to enable them to call a congress together to deliberate on the terms offered by the United States, and would not agree to an unconditional surrender. (Detailed accounts of these conferences are given in Pamphlet VIII.)

May 22, General Otis cabled from Manila the details of General Lawton's return march, and concluded as follows:—

“MacArthur still at San Fernando, and will occupy cities south and westward, insurgent forces disintegrating daily. Luna's force at Tarlac much diminished, has destroyed



several miles of railway in his front, number of officers of mark have deserted Luna, and four have entered Manila for protection. In Pampanga and Bulacan inhabitants returning to homes only fear insurgent troops. South of Manila insurgent disintegration progressing, though large force still maintained, conditions improving daily ; send battalion troops and gunboat to Negros to-morrow, allay excitement in southern portion of island and west coast of Cebu. Have denied request of Aguinaldo's commissioners for armistice.

“ OTIS.”

When it became known that the application for an armistice had been refused by General Otis, the insurgent leaders did everything in their power to convince their followers that nothing remained but to fight until the last man was killed. The only alternative at that time, namely, United States sovereignty, which became known among the insurgents as “autonomy,” was one which the leaders persistently refused to consider. Among the proclamations issued by the leaders to their followers at that time is one issued by Sandico, on the 16th of May, 1899, which says: “Before accepting automony (which we shall do only as a last resort) I think it is our duty to exhaust all our resources for war, organize all our forces, and not consider ourselves conquered until the last cartridge has been fired.”

Early in June, Senor Pedro Paterno, late President of the Philippine Congress and a member of Aguinaldo's cabinet, issued the following proclamation : \*

“ *To the Filipino People :*

“No one is ignorant of the fact that since we took the helm of the ship of state we have sacrificed ourselves to the service of the government of our republic, offering ourselves as victims for the sake of peace, without abandoning the sacred ideal of liberty and independence which fires our country, but the North Americans refuse to suspend hostili-

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\* Otis Report of May 1, 1900, page 361.

ties asked for by us to consult the national assembly seat of the popular will.

“ Well, since they wish it, may the responsibility of the war and its consequences fall on the great nation of the United States of America. We have behaved as patriots and human beings, showing the great powers of the world that the cabinet acts with a diplomacy which protects our cause as do the arms which defend our rights.

“ The council of government, deciding to preserve our republican institutions, national independence and the presidency of Don Emilio Aguinaldo, in spite of the Americans, who intend to construct upon our ruins the edifice of tyranny, has concluded to continue the war, preserving unhurt in their spirit and meaning our constitution and laws, which we have secured and paid for with so much blood and such sacrifices.

“ To war, then, beloved brothers, to war.

“ In order that the people be free it is necessary for them all to be brave, whether rich or poor, learned or ignorant. Beloved Filipinos, hasten to save our native land from insult and ignominy, punishment and scaffolds, and from the sad and fatal inheritance of generations in bondage.

“ The God of war, in whom we have put our faith and hope, is helping us. Interior and international dissensions and conflicts rend the invading army. Its volunteers, being aware that we are in the right, fight without enthusiasm and only in compliance with their forced military duty. Within the American nation itself a great political party asks for the recognition of our rights, and Divine Providence watches over the justice of our cause.

“ Viva the Filipino sovereign people !

“ Viva national independence !

“ Viva the liberating army !

“ Viva Don Emilio Aguinaldo, president of the republic !

“ P. A. PATERNO.\*

“ CABANATUAN, JUNE 2, 1899.”

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\* Pedro Paterno is now the leader of the Federal Party, *i. e.*, the party which aspires to statehood for the Philippines.

### Eastward Expedition.

Meanwhile in Manila plans were maturing for an eastward campaign.

General Otis states : \* "The latter part of May it was reported that the inhabitants at Antipolo, Morong, and other near towns east of Manila were suffering heavily on account of the crimes committed by General Pillar's insurgent troops and they called for protection."

Accordingly, on June 2, immediately after his return to Manila, General Lawton was instructed to collect a force and drive off the insurgents at Antipolo and Morong. The bad roads and excessive heat rendered the expedition a difficult one, although the insurgents were not troublesome. They had scattered, most of them having taken the trails to the mountains where they could not be profitably pursued. The town of Morong was taken without the loss of a man and was occupied by our troops for a time, reconnoissances being made into the interior and along the shore of the Laguna. It is not apparent how much of this territory was held permanently.

### Southern Expedition of June.

Meanwhile, says General Otis : \* "The enemy had become again boldly demonstrative at the south, and it became necessary to throw him back once more." On June 7 General Lawton was instructed to concentrate a force of about 4,000 men and move south.

On this second southern expedition Calamba and Los Banos, two towns on the southern shore of the Laguna de Bay, were captured and held. Besides these towns, a strip of territory due south from Manila for about fifteen miles to

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\*Otis Report for 1899, page 136.

Imus was controlled by our troops and has been held until the present time. The object of this southern expedition had been mainly to open the southern country for traffic with Manila. These efforts, according to General Otis,\* "were not successful to any great extent because of the insurgent bands which appeared at various points on the lake to secure the commercial advantages, and the persistent labors of traders in Manila, either insurgent sympathizers or seekers (who came of varied nationalities) for individual gain, whom pecuniary profit influenced more than conscience or fear of punishment."

#### Insurgent Defeat at San Fernando.

Meanwhile the insurgents in the north were again becoming active. On June 15 from 3,000 to 5,000 insurgents attacked General MacArthur's entire front, and were driven back with heavy loss. "It is reported," said General MacArthur, "with a considerable probability of being true, that Aguinaldo was present in command of troops here this morning, or in the immediate vicinity, supervising operations." † After this defeat the insurgents in the north were comparatively quiet for some time.

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\* Otis Report for 1899, page 141.

† Ibid., page 140.

## II. SUMMER MONTHS.

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### Summary of Conditions.

On August 31 the army in the Philippines numbered 30,963, of whom there were 24,000 for duty. During August General MacArthur, whose troops were now in better shape, had extended his lines 10 miles farther north to Angeles. This move gave the United States control of a narrow strip of territory, about 60 miles in length, from Imus in the south to Angeles in the north. This strip had to be carefully guarded, in order that communications with the outposts might be preserved. The number of men doing garrison duty was necessarily small, and they could do little but protect the railroad track. In many cases it was not safe to venture a quarter of a mile to the right or left of the track.

### Aguinaldo's Letter of September 14.

General Otis says :\*

“The temper of the insurgent troops at this time was confident and aggressive, as we had not made any forward movement since the latter part of June, and the more ignorant appeared to believe that our resources were exhausted. Among the better class of Filipinos, however, impressions were far different, as fully appears from correspondence which has recently come to hand. I cite the following communication of a leading Filipino, of July 7, and the response of Aguinaldo, dated September 14, 1899, to show the divergent views which then prevailed :

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\*Otis Report of May 1, 1900, page 203.

*“ Manila, July 7, 1899.*

“SR. DON EMILIO AGUINALDO :

“MY DEAR DON-EMILIO: Mr. Olimpio Guamson has delivered your message to me, asking for my frank and honest opinion concerning our present political situation, and the probable future which awaits us. I shall give it with pleasure, not only because it is my duty as a Filipino, but because of the sincere friendship which binds me to you. I will refrain from making a critical judgment of all your actions prior to the 4th of February, the date of the Outbreak of Hostilities, taking them simply as data upon which to base my deductions, and will presuppose in all of them good faith from the point of view of the patriotic motives which impelled you to perform them.

“We have commenced hostilities; we have had our wish, for I remember perfectly well that war was the desire of the majority in Malolos, the military element, however, being prominent in this majority, and raising its voice upon the subject, dragging after it the rest of the people. And what has been gained? Nothing but ruin, death, and desolation.

“We have not been able to prevent the Americans from going anywhere they pleased, and it has been plainly evident that the valor upon which we depended was not enough, but to conquer it is necessary to have many things which the Americans possess in abundance, and which we lack.

“As time goes on our chances for victory grow less, and the further the American troops advance so much worse is our condition for asking concessions for our unhappy country.

“Up to the present time the American troops, in my opinion, have had no other object in view than to show their bravery, a quality which had unjustly and erroneously been denied them both privately and in the public press. So far, either on that account or for other reasons, America has not sent here an army capable of a military occupation of all our territory, nor has a formal campaign been commenced;

that America can do so we are unable to doubt, and that it will be done if we persist in our present attitude we may feel certain. And what will then remain to us? What could we ask for?

“We are in error, and yet we persist in that error, impelled by those who dream of a triumph of a party which is to-day in a minority in the United States, without perceiving that this party is also American, and that they are not going to give us our independence out of hand as a matter of sentiment at the expense of the honor of America and in spite of the grave responsibility, both international and domestic, contracted under the Treaty of Paris. Others dream that because part of the press of Europe copies from American anti-imperialist papers the criticisms of that party against the Government of President McKinley a European intervention in our favor is to take place, without reflecting that the Treaty of Paris was made before all the civilized world and with its assent.

“The war so far has only laid bare our insufficiency and our shortcomings.

“In my judgment, giving these conditions, the time has arrived for your policy to change in a radical manner, unless you wish to see forever annihilated the hope that our people may some day take its place in the concert of the civilized world, unless you wish to see the complete ruin of our race and of all our country, and unless you are willing to accept the grave responsibilities which will fall upon you. To-day then I address you as a friend and as a Filipino and say ‘Peace is an imperative necessity. Nothing can prevent the triumph of America. Do not struggle against the inevitable. Peace must come some time, and the man who restores peace to the Philippines will win the admiration of the world, and the gratitude of his country. Be that man. Since 1896 you have been the soul of the people, and have merited their blessings for your wonderful and providential wisdom. Be now the peace-maker that your glory may be perpetuated. As you are the man who, when brought here by the Ameri-

cans, roused the people as one to the work of our emancipation from Spain, be now the one to say "Enough of conflict. We have seen that our ideals cannot be realized by this means; let us make peace, and let us work and learn. For by working and learning with a free people, such as the Americans, we shall cast from us the vices of our old masters, and will some day win the independence we so much desire."

"This is what I believe you are called upon to do, and I think that you will never repent it. There is no other remedy — no other path open. Do not forget that many Filipinos are losing their lives every day in the defense of the impossible: that every day the ruin of property sacrificed in vain is greater, and that, if finally there is no help other than to submit to American sovereignty, it is not just to sacrifice more lives and property, whereby you will contract before God and man responsibilities of such proportions that they alarm me.

"Stop while you may, and believe me that now is the appointed time: a little later the policy of the American Government will change completely the sentiment of that free and noble people, which loves its own liberty as much as it desires that of other nations, and then a race war will come which will end in our extermination.

"I believe that with what I have said I have performed my duty and complied with your wishes. I must, however, state that I have done so freely, without suggestions or coercions of any kind, and also that I have made no special political studies, nor have I had preparation for speaking upon matters of this nature. The only merit of this opinion is that it is the manifestation of the intimate conviction of a citizen who is inspired by the best of good faith and the desire of his people.

"I am, as ever, your affectionate friend and obedient servant,

"B. LEGARDA."



“(Personal.)

“REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,  
“OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

“*Tarlac, September 14, 1899.*

“SR. BENITO LEGARDA, *Manila.*

“MY DISTINGUISHED FRIEND: Your two kind letters have reached my hands and I have informed myself of all you say in them. Many thanks for the information you give me. I beg that you will pardon me for my delay in making reply, but I must tell you that sometime elapsed before they reached me.

“I believe what you tell me as to the re-enforcements of the enemy which will not be long in arriving. Not only do I believe this, but I am convinced of this fact, and even before the outbreak of hostilities was sure that with their wealth and their innumerable and powerful elements of war, they could, whenever they so desired, send as many as they need. In reply to this I must tell you that it is impossible for me to turn back from the enterprise which I have undertaken — that of defending our country, and especially as I have sworn that as long as life lasts I shall labor until I gain the acknowledgment of the independence of the Philippines. Do not attribute this declaration to my vanity, but to my desire to fulfill a former promise. This, aside from the fact that the struggle for the independence of our country is just and based upon our perfect rights.

“We are not alarmed by the numerous arms nor the valor of our enemy. What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? It is a pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their country. I repeat, we will not give up the struggle until we gain our longed-for independence: death is of but little moment to us if we are but able to ensure the happiness of the people and of future generations.

“We must no longer allow ourselves to be fascinated by

the flattering promises of the enemy. You know that they first solemnly assured me that they would acknowledge our independence. Nevertheless, the attempt is now being made to force autonomy on us by superior strength. They have been using explosive bullets since the 9th of August last, and have bombarded defenceless forts, contrary to the precepts of international law. But it matters not that they use these elements of destructive warfare. Resistance and firmness of our resolution will be sufficient to wear them out. If this is not enough to induce our enemies to desist from their endeavor, we will go, if necessary, into the mountains, but never will we accept a treaty of peace dishonorable to the Philippine arms and disastrous to the future of the country, such as that which they seek to impose. For this reason I advise all those who do not feel themselves strong enough to accept this sacrifice, and whose services are not indispensable to our Government, to return to Manila and the towns occupied by the enemy, reserving themselves to strengthen the organization of our Government when our independence is gained, replacing those who, wearied by the struggle, are in need of rest.

“I am not displeased that some Filipinos have consented to hold office under the Americans; on the contrary, I rejoice that they have done so, for thus they will be enabled to form a true estimate of the character of the Americans. I also rejoice that our enemies having had recourse to the Filipinos for the discharge of the duties of high positions in the public service in its various branches, have shown that they recognize the capacity of our people for self-government.

“Before closing I take the liberty of addressing you the following question: To what is due that policy of attraction employed by our enemy if not to the resistance of our army? ‘One should never repent of a just determination.’

“Kind regards to your family, and to Messrs. Arellano, Pardo, Torres, and other friends.

“Command at will your most affectionate friend,

“E. AGUINALDO.”

**Insurgent Comments on Political Situation in the  
United States.**

It was evident at this time that the insurgents were keeping close watch of the political situation in the United States. On the 31st of August, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation, in which he encouraged his followers by assuring them that the Democratic party in the United States was engaged in defending the Filipinos. The proclamation concludes : \*

“Notice for yourselves that among the Americans here there are some who are reasonable and although they take up arms against us, being compromised and under discipline to do so, they understand that justice and right are on our side, and have even deserted from their ranks and come to ours in order not to be implicated in this war, which is pronounced by the illustrious North American, Mr. Atkinson, as criminal aggression, and although we have offered them facilities to return to their commands they have refused to do so.”

General Otis says : \*

“The assertions contained in this paper of Aguinaldo’s were made after three months of comparative quiet on our part, in so far as active war was concerned, interrupted occasionally by sharply thrusting back the enemy, who, gaining assurance by our attitude, attacked the salient points of the long lines we were maintaining while awaiting the arrival of the troops to take the place of the returning volunteers. The insurgents were greatly encouraged that no signal advance had been made into the country of their possession. But now our troops were pushing forward and the insurgent secretary of war exhorted his army by an appeal which might live in history had it any basis of truth. It is as follows :

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\* Otis Report of May 1, 1900, page 364.

“TO THE GENERALS, CHIEF OFFICERS, AND SOLDIERS OF  
THE FILIPINO ARMY:

“There is no doubt that the war against the Filipinos is waged, not by the people of the United States, but by what is called the Imperialist party, the party of McKinley, which is in power today. The North American nation prefers peace, not because it has ceased to desire the riches of our soil, but because it wants to take them without risks and without adventures, without having to take any chances. The Imperialist party would not have attempted to seize them if the easy victory over Spain had not made it believe that the Filipinos would be found equally easy to defeat.

“The firmness, however, of the Filipino people, and the heroic resistance of our army is dissipating this delusion, but as the prestige of this party is greatly compromised, General Otis, who represents it in the Philippines, in his tenacious desire to keep up the defence of the expansionists, has gone on asking for reinforcements and more reinforcements from his Government, which the people, not trusting him this time, have diminished. But the date of the Presidential election in that country is approaching, and the re-election or fall of McKinley will decide the good or bad end of this mad enterprise undertaken by him. Interference of the Continental European powers in this palpitating international question is again feared, and everything makes us believe that the Yankee army, with or without large reinforcements, is about to make a final effort before the Imperialist party admits it is beaten. It is the general opinion within our Republic and abroad, that if we resist this attack, as in the past we have held back the American line, we shall have reached the end of our sacrifices and attained our independence, and it will be most gallantly conquered.

“The critical moment, accordingly, is approaching. It will be the moment of life or death for us, and however great may be the force of that bastard passion, Ambition, it cannot prevail over the courage produced by legitimate and holy

desires like ours for liberty and political emancipation. Hence, our dear and honorable president, the government and the Filipino people hope that once again you will make our enemy bite the dust, and that once again you will give proofs of that legendary valor to-day so notorious and admired over the whole world: and then in the ease of peace you will be able to pluck your conquered laurels with the legitimate satisfaction which comes from duty well done, and receive the rewards which the government will bestow upon you.

“AMBROSIO FLORES,

“*Secretary of War.*”

“OCTOBER 5, 1899.”

#### General Otis's Summary of September.\*

“Only minor military operations were attempted in September, since, as in August, the troops were busily engaged in relieving those directed to depart from the islands, there being two volunteer regiments in Panay, Negros and Cebu, which had to be withdrawn, and also a few organizations on the outer Luzon lines which were to be replaced. This exchange was effected as rapidly as vessels could be secured to transport men and supplies. Necessary repairs to the railway and rolling stock in our possession were vigorously prosecuted. Dispositions were being constantly effected to commence the execution of a well-determined plan of operation in northern Luzon as soon as an available force would justify it, and continued caution was exercised to neutralize the enemy's aggressive movements and to severely punish him for the temerity he was expected to display. Since the early portion of July he had gradually become more bold because of our apparent quiet, and was inclined to take the initiative wherever he might consider an opportunity offered. His troops attacked various portions of General MacArthur's lines at the north, made various attempts to cripple the rail-

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\* Otis Report of May 1, 1900, page 207.

road between Manila and San Fernando, the continued working of which was essential for the forwarding of troops and supplies required in the contemplated northern operations and the forwarding of subsistence to the men holding that section of the country. They threatened the lines about the city of Manila, concentrating at Marquina, San Mateo, Montalban and vicinity, in the provinces of Manila and Bulacan, and to the eastward in the province of Morong. They gathered and attacked Calamba on the Laguna de Bay, also the strong outpost at Imus, province of Cavite, and in fact the retired line which General Lawton maintained along the bay front from Pasay to Bacoor. The insurgents of the city of Manila again became somewhat confident, and under a chief, an influential Tagalo appointed to the position by Aguinaldo in July (whose letter of appointment has been secured), actively engaged in supplying the insurgent troops with contraband of war, and in plotting for another uprising within the city's most densely populated sections."

### III. FALL CAMPAIGN.

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#### Last Efforts to Secure Recognition.

During October a final effort was made to secure recognition for the insurgent government, or at the least an interview with General Otis, when, it was believed, another effort would be made to secure an armistice.

On October 18 the insurgent Secretary of War, Ambrosio Flores, wrote General MacArthur that Aguinaldo wished to send a military commission to Manila in order to arrange with General Otis for the delivery of some Spanish prisoners. The letter stated that the commissioners had "other commissions of a pacific character." \* The request was submitted to General Otis, who replied that he was "unable to recognize or receive any commission of gentlemen accredited by General Aguinaldo, unless accredited by him solely in his character of general-in-chief of the insurgent forces." †

Secretary Flores then wrote a second letter (on October 22) repeating his request, in the name of the "Government of the Philippine Republic," and asking that this letter be submitted entire to General Otis. Brigadier-General Schwan replied to General MacArthur for General Otis that inasmuch as any prisoners might be delivered to General MacArthur at San Fernando, there could be no object in a commission sent to Manila for that purpose. The letter alluded to the "prolonged, cruel and unwarrantable captivity" ‡ of the said Spanish prisoners, and continued, "I am further instructed

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\* Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session, page 73.

† Ibid., page 74.

‡ Ibid., page 77. The treatment of the Spanish prisoners by the Filipinos is described by Mr. Albert Sounichsen, who was for some time a fellow prisoner with them, in his "Ten Months' Captivity Among the Filipinos."

to say that the commanding general has no official information or knowledge from his government of the parties styling themselves, or who are styled in the correspondence, as 'my honorable president' or as the 'general secretary of war' and hence is debarred from making official recognition of their communications which you have received."\*

To this communication from General Schwan, forwarded by General MacArthur, Secretary Flores replied as follows: †

“(Translation.)

“PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC,

“OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR,

“*Tarlak, 28th October, 1899.*

“GENERAL MACARTHUR,

“*Commander of the United States Forces in Angeles.*

“SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the esteemed letter of your excellency, dated the 26th instant with the documents which accompany it as instructions of your general in chief, General Otis.

“In reply I must inform your excellency that we cannot send prisoners through the lines, because, considering the distance of different points where they are, it is, humanely speaking, impossible for them to survive (escape?) the great difficulties of arriving at the lines.

“The said prisoners are scattered at various points in the island, for which reason you will see from the subjoined decree we have seen fit to liberate them in seaports. Here is the reason for the necessity of conferring with his excellency, General Otis, who is aware of the true and pitiable situation of the prisoners, which certainly places the stamp of humanity on this affair.

“With respect to the treatment which we give, I have nothing more to say than that it necessarily corresponds with our political condition, which your clear intellect will perfectly understand.

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\* Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session, page 77.

† *Ibid.*, page 78.



"And apropos of the suspiciousness which might be entertained as to the character of the treatment, permit me, General, to declare that in the name of soldierly honor, common to you and to me, I protest against such suspicion, as we have never resorted to indirect means in order to wrest by artifice the recognition of our beloved independence.

"This is very clear, because we seek by the light of day this right, which belongs to us by natural law, defending it openly and nobly by means of arms and diplomacy.

"If in spite of these declarations General Otis does not admit the commission to General Aguinaldo, we will lament it on account of the unfortunate prisoners.

"Thanking your excellency and General Otis once more for the courtesy and consideration which you have shown me on this occasion, I am always your warm admirer.

"The general secretary of War,

"AMBROSIO FLORES.

"Official copy of translation,

"BENJ. ALVORD,

"*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

"A true copy,

"THOMAS H. BARRY,

"*Assistant Adjutant-General.*"

The correspondence was reported to Washington as follows: \*

(Cablegram. — Received at War Department, November 9, 1899.)

"AGWAR, *Washington.*

"*Manila.*

"Spanish commission sent to Tarlac to make arrangements for release of Spanish prisoners returned a few days ago. Aguinaldo would not treat with them, as Spain had not formally recognized insurgent government. General MacArthur telegraphs to-day that he has just received at Mabalacat, under flag of truce, communication from insurgent secretary of war, dated 5th instant, asking that if I am powerless to

\* Senate Document 208, page 79.

formally receive Spanish prisoners from insurgent government I cable to Washington for permission to do this in interest of humanity. Letter states if insurgent application not granted, insurgent government will regard its humane offer withdrawn, and remarks that their national pride imposes duty of not delivering prisoners except to a nation; that Spain cannot receive them, because Otis opposes, and Otis does not desire to receive them.

“Communication concludes by stating that in view of difficulties this affair will have to be completely terminated to the prejudice of the unfortunate prisoners, much to the regret and without any responsibility on the part of the insurgent government. In response to former insurgent applications I have informed Aguinaldo that we would be glad to receive and take care of all prisoners if he would simply send them in. The insurgents never intended to give prisoners up unless they could force money payments and recognition in exchange. They have not brought them in from the mountains. Aguinaldo now reported to be in full retreat for Bayombong; his government believed to be much scattered.

“OTIS.”

#### Secretary Root's Summary of October 10.

The military situation in the Philippines at this time was summarized by Secretary Root in his annual report as follows :\*

“By the 10th October the process of changing armies and the approach of the dry season had reached a point where an advance towards the general occupation of the country was justified.

“At that time the American lines extended from the Bay of Manila to Laguna de Bay, and included considerable parts of the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, and Morong to the south and east of Manila, substantially all of the province of Manila and the southern parts of Bulacan and Pampanga, dividing the

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\* Report of Secretary of War for 1899, page 8.

insurgent forces into two widely separated parts. To the south and east of our lines in Cavite and Morong were numerous bands occasionally concentrating for attack on our lines, and as frequently dispersed and driven back toward the mountains. On the 6th of October, the insurgents in this region having again gathered and attacked our lines of communication, General Schwan with a column of 1726 men commenced a movement from Bacoor, in the province of Cavite, driving the enemy through Old Cavite, Noveleta, Santa Cruz, San Francisco de Malabon, Laban, and Perez des Merinas, punishing them severely, scattering them and destroying them as organized forces, and returning on the 13th to Bacoor.

“On the north of our lines stretched the great plain of central Luzon extending north from Manila about 120 miles. This plain comprises parts of the provinces of Manila, Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, and Pangasinan. It is, roughly speaking, bounded on the south by the Bay of Manila; on the east and west by high mountain ranges separating it from the seacoasts, and on the north by mountains and the Gulf of Lingayen. Through the northeast and central portion flows the Rio Grande from the northern mountains southeasterly to the Bay of Manila, and near the western edge runs the only railroad on the island of Luzon in a general southeasterly direction from Dagupan, on the Bay of Lingayen, to Manila. In this territory Aguinaldo exercised a military dictatorship, and with a so-called cabinet initiated the forms of civil government, having his headquarters at Tarlac, which he called his capital, and which is situated near the centre of the western boundary of the plain.”

#### Southern Expedition.

October 7, General Schwan was put in command of an expedition sent south into the province of Cavite, whose object was “to punish and if possible to destroy or break up

the insurgent forces in the province of Cavite which had recently shown considerable activity in attacking our line on both sides of the Tibagan River from Imus northward to Bacoor and Paranaque."\* This expedition of a week's duration was later summarized by Major-General J. C. Bates as follows: †

"An expedition under General Schwan in October, 1899, had driven the enemy back from his entrenchments on the south line, and had penetrated as far as Dasmarinas [about five miles south of Imus, the point already held by our troops]; but owing to the necessity of employing the greater part of our troops elsewhere, and the consequent lack of sufficient force to hold the ground thus gained, it had again been relinquished to the rebels, who had been further reenforced by portions of the defeated armies that had retreated from the northern provinces. The insurgents occupied Cavite Viejo and were practically in contact with our lines at Imus. We held Paranaque, Bacoor, Big Bend and Imus, and immediately south of the city of Manila occupied a line running through San Pedro Macati to Pasig, and thence to Taguig. Calamba and Los Banos were held by our forces as advanced posts, so to speak, of the general line, our control of the Laguna de Bay enabling troops at these points to be easily supplied. Beyond the lines mentioned, the theatre in which operations were to be conducted was entirely in the hands of the insurgents."

It was expected that the insurgents would remain quiet for some time after this expedition. General Schwan himself said: ‡

"The effect of the punishment is evidenced by the quiet that has since its administration prevailed on the south line, where, as reported by an aide-de-camp of General Grant, not a shot had been fired in fifteen days." However, General Otis states: §

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\* Report of Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, 1900, Part 4, page 465.

† Ibid., page 640.

‡ Ibid., page 477.

§ Ibid., Part 2, page 347.

“The enemy at the south recovered his courage sooner than was anticipated, and, probably following Aguinaldo’s instructions for general active demonstrations, given as soon as our northern advance was commenced, displayed unusual activity.”

General Otis explains the above fact as follows :\*

“The constant activity of the insurgents in the vicinity of Manila, to the east in the province of Morong, and to the south in the province of Cavite and Batangas, had its chief inspiration in Tarlac, and was the result of the efforts of the agents of Aguinaldo, assisted by the subordinate officers of Lieutenant-General Trias, who commanded all the enemy’s forces in southern Luzon. The work of recruiting and sending out men from Manila for the insurgent ranks never ceased, and supplies and munitions of war for the enemy continued to pass out, notwithstanding all our efforts, mostly by the waterways. On July 3, 1899, Aguinaldo appointed a resident of the city of Manila, a Chinese mestizo, a man of considerable influence, a former member of the insurgent congress, a lawyer, an aspirant for the position of insurgent solicitor of the islands, ‘his sole and legitimate representative’ in the city of Manila, ‘fully authorizing him, after he had taken possession of said functions, to delegate them to such person or persons to assist him as he sees fit, if by so doing he serves the interests of the republic.’ The junta formed under these instructions contained a number of shrewd Filipinos. They were watched, but not restrained of their liberties until the early spring, as no decided hostile act of commission could be proven against them. When arrested they professed to be the most loyal of American subjects, claimed to be working incessantly for American supremacy, and expressed a desire to take at once the oath of allegiance. The principal was placed in confinement. The others took the oath and were released.

“The captured insurgent correspondence shows that this principal was in very frequent communication with the authori-

\* Report of Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, 1900, Part 2, page 358.

ties from whom he received his appointment. In a communication of August 15 he was informed from Tarlac of the receipt there of many of his letters, and was assured 'that there is nothing to fear from those who are at the front of our government, nor from the people. All are disposed to make the greatest sacrifices and to be reduced to fugitive life of the nomad before abandoning the sacred ideal of our independence!'"

For some time no further expedition south could be organized, as every man was needed in the north. In December, General Otis states that in the southern Luzon provinces "the enemy confronted by the troops of the First Division (General Lawton's) still held intact its entire strength."

#### Disruption of the Insurgent Government.

The movement of primary importance at this time was the northward campaign begun in October. The plan of campaign was much the same as before, only that by this time the main body of insurgents had moved so much farther north that the plan became more complicated. MacArthur was to proceed to Dagupan, about 100 miles north of Manila. General Lawton was to go to San Jose almost due east from Dagupan. General Wheaton was to go to San Fabian about ten miles north of Dagupan on the shores of the Gulfo de Lingayen. From there he was to connect with MacArthur and throw out a column eastward. General Young proceeding northwest from San Jose was to effect a junction with General Wheaton, thus cutting off all lines of escape to the north. Thus a movement shaped like three sides of a square was substituted for the former arrangement which more nearly resembled two sides of a triangle. In this way the insurgents were to be hemmed in, Aguinaldo captured and the insurrection effectually ended. The campaign was admirably planned, and had it not been for the heavy rains and the

difficulty of transportation would very likely have succeeded. As it was the results of the campaign were as follows :

On October 22 MacArthur once more took up the march northward. He captured and held Mabalacat and Bamban, positions 7 and 10 miles north on the main line. He also took and subsequently abandoned Magalang a little to the east, and Porac a little to the west.

On November 12 two Filipinos surrendered guns to MacArthur's troops, receiving in payment \$30 Mexican for each gun. Later in the day MacArthur reported as follows : \*

“CAPAS, November 12, 1899.

“GENERAL SCHWAN, *Chief of Staff, Manila.*

“Eleven men, armed insurgents, have surrendered, making 13 men, who have delivered to us 14 guns, one of the guns belonging to a sick man who has not yet come in. All of the men have returned to urge others of their comrades to come in and spread the information that every man who surrenders a gun will receive \$30 Mexican. Now that the thing has started, we may have a large number of surrenders. I would like, if some arrangements could be made, to have a considerable amount of silver available, so that we could make cash payments as the guns are delivered. I think the situation is now such that if we could just hand out the money every time we got a gun it would go far toward bringing about a collapse of the insurgent army on this line.

“MACARTHUR.”

Proceeding steadily northward MacArthur's troops under Bell entered Tarlac† November 12, finding the city practically deserted.

On November 13 the insurgents held an important council of war, which is described at length by General MacArthur, as follows : ‡

\* Report of Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, 1900, Part 2, page 249.

† On October 5 Aguinaldo had changed the capital from Tarlac to Bayombong.

‡ MacArthur's Report for 1900, page 1.

“At a council of war held at Bayambang, Pangasinan, about November 12, 1899, which was attended by General Aguinaldo and many of the Filipino military leaders, a resolution was adopted to the effect that the insurgent forces were incapable of further resistance in the field, and as a consequence it was decided to disband the army, the generals and the men to return to their own provinces, with a view to organizing the people for general resistance by means of guerilla warfare.

“As affording an interesting, suggestive, and authentic glimpse of the proceedings of the council, a copy of an order bearing the autograph signature of Aguinaldo, found in possession of General Pantaleone Garcia, who was captured May 6, 1900, is respectfully inserted immediately below.

“In accordance with the present politico-military status in this, the center of Luzon, and using the powers I possess, in accordance with my council of government, I decree the following :

“1. The politico-military command of the center of Luzon is hereby established, comprising the provinces of Bataan, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, Zambales, and Pangasinan.

“2. The superior commander in question will have full and extraordinary powers to issue orders by proclamation, impose contributions of war and to adopt all such measures as may seem for the good service of the country.

“3. The troops which will operate in all of the described districts will manœuvre in flying columns and in guerilla bands ; these will be under the orders of the aforesaid superior commander, to whose orders all the other leaders and generals will be subject, reporting to him and receiving from him the orders and instructions of the government ; nevertheless, all orders received direct from the government will be obeyed and advice of same will be given to the superior commander aforesaid.

“4. Sr. Don Pantaleone Garcia, General of Division, is appointed Politico-Military Commander of the center of



Luzon, and he will assume, in addition, the judicial powers which belong to me as Captain-General.

“ ‘ Given at Bayambang, November 12, 1899.

“ ‘ The President,

“ ‘ (Signed) EMILIO AGUINALDO.’ ”

General MacArthur entered Bayambang November 19. This city, the last capital chosen by the insurgents, is some 90 miles north of Manila. Its capture, together with the disbanding of the Filipino Congress and the seizure of certain important insurgent leaders, meant the disruption of the insurgent government. The following dispatch reported the news to Manila : \*

“ BAYAMBANG, *November 23, 1899.*

“ GENERAL SCHWAN :

“ The so-called Filipino Republic is destroyed. The congress has dissolved. The president of that body is now a prisoner in our hands. The president of the so-called Republic is a fugitive, as are all the cabinet officers, excepting one in our hands. The executive department is therefore broken up. The generals are separated, without any power of conference or concerted action. The authority under which an army was kept in the field no longer exists. The army itself as an organization has disappeared. As a consequence of these facts, which are now of historical record, the men who propose to lead small bodies for purpose of guerilla warfare must act without even a shadow of authority from a *de facto* government, and their operations from this time on will be the results of individual whims. In other words, men who now try to continue the strife by individual action become simply leaders of banditti, and in this view how would it do to issue a proclamation at an early date offering complete amnesty to all who surrender within a stated time, with a payment of 30 pesos to every soldier who gives up a rifle, and declare with emphasis that after the date fixed the killing of American soldiers would be regarded as murder and

\* Report of Lieutenant-General commanding the Army, 1900, page 276.

that all persons concerned therein would be regarded as murderers and treated accordingly? Such a proclamation would have the effect of forcing the generals to consider the expediency of continuing the hopeless struggle which would commit them irrevocably to death or lifelong expatriation, and I think would have a powerful influence at a time when it is apparent that most if not all of the leaders are more or less doubtful of what course to pursue. This suggestion is for your personal consideration, to be presented to the department commander at your discretion.

“MACARTHUR.”

With regard to the suggestion contained in this dispatch, General Otis states as follows :\*

“General MacArthur’s repeated invitations to issue a proclamation declaring all insurgents without the pale of the laws of war, and calling upon them to give adhesion to American authority, else suffer the consequences which the law prescribed, were not favorably considered, although the facts and conclusions presented were undeniable and had become matter for consideration before he submitted them. I endeavored to ascertain if any formal decree had been issued by Aguinaldo or by his authority which directed guerilla warfare, but was always assured that no orders to that effect had been given ; that at the meeting at Bayambang, held on November 13, which he and his principal officers attended, those participating verbally agreed among themselves that each would take the field with such force as he might be able to maintain, and attack us wherever success was likely to reward him. Of course it made little difference whether or not the insurgents were acting under orders, as the fact that they were engaged in armed opposition of a character universally condemned was sufficient in itself to justify us in imposing the most severe measures ; but was it policy? Should a proclamation be issued, it must be made operative throughout the Philippines, and the portion of the same we commanded was

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\*Report of Lieutenant-General commanding the army, 1900, Part 2, page 286.

only a fragmentary part of the entire Philippine country. We could not so publish it as to bring it within the knowledge of the ignorant masses from which the insurgent armed force was drawn. As late even as February officers of rank commanding insurgent troops in southeastern Luzon were not aware that Aguinaldo had been driven from his capital at Tarlac, but were addressing their official communications to him there, still styling him 'The Honorable Presidente of the Filipino Republic.'"

The news of the disruption of the insurgent government was cabled to Washington as follows :\*

"NOVEMBER 24, 1899.

"Claim to government by insurgents can be made no longer under any fiction, its treasurer, secretary interior, and president of congress in our hands : its president and remaining cabinet officers in hiding, evidently in different central Luzon provinces : its generals and troops in small bands, scattered through these provinces, acting as banditti, or dispersed, playing the role of amigos, with arms concealed : indications are that Aguinaldo did not escape through the lines of Lawton or Wheaton, but fled westward from Bayambang railway station. Telegraphic communication of Dagupan established probably to San Fabian today. By relaying nine miles of track with material at hand, railway communication to that point re-established : labor of troops must attend maintenance. To the south and east of Manila 4,000 armed insurgents concentrated in three bodies, they will receive attention soon."

### The Pursuit of Aguinaldo.

#### A. GENERAL LAWTON'S MOVEMENTS.

Meanwhile General Lawton, who had left Manila October 15, with 3,500 men, was encountering great difficulties on his line of march. General Lawton's plans were : First, to take

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\* Report of Secretary of War for 1899, page 65.

and hold the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, which was some 70 miles in length, thus covering all roads and trails to the east, preventing the escape of the enemy from the line of the railroad in that direction. Second, by pre-arrangement to make a junction as expeditiously as possible with General Wheaton's column from the sea coast, thus attaining the rear of the enemy's forces, and cutting off all chances of escape to the north and northeast.

The heavy rains, impassable roads, and swollen rivers, made the expedition a hazardous one and the forwarding of supplies most difficult. Major Lee says, "Never in the history of similar warfare were greater difficulties presented. Often the rivers were so high that the improvised ferries were swept away and boats could hardly stem the rapid current, and then the river falling rapidly, it seemed that everything went aground; the country was flooded, the roads quagmired, and trails almost impassable."

In spite of all difficulties, however, General Lawton pressed on. He proceeded along the same line he had taken in the spring, recapturing the towns which he had been obliged to abandon at that time. He reported the outlook "about the same as when I was here in May."\*

San Isidro was recaptured October 22, and used as temporary headquarters by General Lawton. General Young proceeded north to Cabanatuan, where he was joined by General Lawton, November 6. On the following day General Young began his separate movement, whose object was to cut off all the northeastern trails to the mountains. On that same day General Wheaton had reached San Fabian on the shores of the Lingayen Gulf in the western part of the island. General Wheaton at once connected with General MacArthur at Bayambang. General Lawton started westward November 12, the same day that Tarlac was captured by General MacArthur. On November 18 General Lawton overtook General Young and had a conference with him. By that time it was apparent that Aguinaldo had slipped between

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\* Report of Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, 1900, Part 2, page 219.

General Wheaton's and General Young's lines and gotten to the north of our troops. Accordingly, General Young was sent in pursuit, and General Lawton proceeded westward, joining General Wheaton at San Fabian November 19. From San Fabian he wrote General Otis in part as follows :\*

*" San Fabian, P. I., November 19, 1899.*

“ CHIEF OF STAFF, *Manila :*

“ I was enabled to leave the point where I was water-bound the night of the 17th, and proceeded in search of General Young. I overtook him at Pozorubio at 10 A. M. the 18th inst., just ready to leave on trail of Aguinaldo. He seemed to be satisfied that he was on the right trail and that Aguinaldo had actually passed out in the direction indicated. I enclose copy of statement made by a prominent citizen of the place, the truth of which I have no reason to doubt. I greatly regret the insurgents were not ‘ shut up in the railroad country ’ by the troops ‘ at the north, ’ as I was assured they would ‘ probably ’ be, in General Otis’s communication of the 2d instant, or that said troops were not extended to Binalonan and Tayug, as I was informed they would be in your message of the 9th instant, or that they did not hold the points occupied by them, and from which they were almost immediately withdrawn. Hearing nothing, however, from the column in the north, General Young, without hesitation, pushed rapidly across the Agno River and occupied the country to and near the coast, not in time, however, to make the necessary disposition, to intercept Aguinaldo, who passed out via Urdaneta, Manaoag and Pozorubio, with Young in hot pursuit and fighting with his rear guard. Aguinaldo will probably strike the main coast at Ago, where the trail on which he now is comes into said road. I have just received the enclosed note from General Young, dated last night. He has the Macabebes and 50 picked men of Chase’s troop and 30 picked men of Captain Johnston’s troop, Third Cavalry, under Chase. On receipt of Young’s

\* Report of Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, 1900, Part 4, page 165.

note I dispatched Major Swigert with available men of two troops, Third Cavalry, and Lieutenant-Colonel Parker to Agoo by road to cut off Aguinaldo, if possible, and to co-operate with Young. Young seems very sanguine. He will at least make Aguinaldo very unhappy. It is my opinion Aguinaldo should be followed every moment from this time. He should not be permitted to establish himself at any point or again organize a government or army. Wherever he can go an American soldier can follow, and there are many who are anxious to undertake the service."

"From this time forward," says Major Lee,\* "General Lawton was occupied night and day with the difficult problem of supplying and reenforcing General Young, keeping open lines of communication over almost impassable roads in his rear and the front, disposing troops to the right and left front over mountains, trails, and rivers to prevent concentration of insurgents, whip and capture their scattered forces and release American and Spanish prisoners."

#### B. GENERAL YOUNG'S PURSUIT.

All interest now centered upon General Young's pursuit of Aguinaldo. General Otis, in Manila, felt very doubtful as to which direction Aguinaldo had followed. He finally came to the conclusion that if Aguinaldo had gone north, he could not have more than two or three hundred men with him. He says: †

"At this time it was not supposed that General Young would meet with very determined opposition, as the Tagalos at the north were deserting and passing southward in small detachments. It was believed also that the mass of the northern Luzon population was friendly and would assist our purposes. For many months reports had been received at Manila expressing the desire of this people to have the Tagalos driven from their midst and to receive and be pro-

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\* Report of Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, 1900, Part 4, page 19.

† Ibid., Part 2, page 313.

tected by our troops. The hearty welcome which the inhabitants of the cities and barrios of that section accorded our soldiers, both on the west coast of the island and in the Cagayan Valley, indicated the correctness of these reports, and little concern was felt for the safety of the small force which General Young had taken into the mountains."

Accordingly, when General Otis heard that March had sent a battalion to reinforce Young, he recalled it at once.

"This battalion, however," says General Otis,\* "marched to join General Young with such rapidity that it was impossible to arrest it, and it was fortunate that such proved to be the case, as in the subsequent forced release of the Spanish prisoners, and in the establishment of pacific conditions in the province of Ilocos Norte, its services proved extremely valuable. Aguinaldo was pushed northeastward into the province of Bontoc. His troops, which were guarding his large number of prisoners in the vicinity of Vigan, retired, with those of them who were not successful in escaping, into the mountains to the eastward, and between those troops and their chief, communication was possible by the Abra River trail."

On November 25 General Otis sent the following dispatch to Washington: †

"Vessel from Singapore Gulf, with dispatches from Wheaton to 23d. instant, brought in Buencamino, ‡ insurgent secretary state, captured 21st instant; he was with Aguinaldo and party; left Tarlac night 13th, to be escorted north by 2,000 troops from Bayambang and Dagupan. These troops Wheaton struck at San Jacinto, and Gomez eastward. Aguinaldo with part of family escaped north with 200 men, passing between Young and Wheaton: Young still in pursuit last accounts, and has been rationed at San Fernando.

"Aguinaldo's mother and oldest child, with Buencamino, separated from rest of party; mother lost in woods, and

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\* Report of Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, 1900, Part 2, page 313.

† Report of Secretary of War for 1899, page 65.

‡ Buencamino is also a member of the Federal Party at present.

child, 4 years old, with Wheaton's troops; \$2,000 in gold belonging to mother captured and now in Manila treasury. Heavy storm in Luzon has prevented landing of troops there from the north. MacArthur has captured insurgent director of railroad who endeavored to destroy railroad to Dagupan; also Captain Lawrence, Englishman, who served Aguinaldo's artillery. Telegraph not working north of Tarlac to-day. Lawton believed to be on military road to Bayambang. Roads now practicable for wagons, and supplies for him being forwarded."

#### C. GENERAL YOUNG'S ACCOUNT.

The details of General Young's pursuit of Aguinaldo are best set forth in his own report from which we quote: \*

"On November 17 I sent from Pozorrubio to Major-General Otis a dispatch stating that 'Aguinaldo is now a fugitive and an outlaw, seeking security in escape to the mountains or by sea. My cavalry have ridden down his forces wherever found, utterly routing them in every instance, killing some, capturing and liberating many prisoners, and destroying many arms, ammunition, and other war impediments.'

"We learned that the insurgents had killed here 3 carabaos and one native cow and carried the meat off.

"Aguinaldo was seventy-two hours in the lead at this point. Cronin had been very near him.

"Our march was forced to Rosario, where we arrived sixty hours after Aguinaldo's departure. Here we found his abandoned carts. His baggage was packed over the difficult mountain trail to Tubao on carabaos. A deserter came into our lines here with the information that Aguinaldo's rear guard was in Tubao, but said that the trail was impassable for our big horses. This man willingly consented to guide us. Scattered bands of insurgents kept our outposts busy all night; we found two dead ones in the morning. The trail leading to Tubao was extremely difficult: two horses and

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\* Report of Lieutenant-General commanding the Army, 1900, Part 4, page 279.



one man were disabled. We passed many exhausted and abandoned native horses and carabaos in a valley extending 6 or 7 miles southeast from Tubao, in which is a fair road. Horses, cattle, and carts had been in waiting for Aguinaldo at the point where the mountain trail came into this road. After preparing our camp in Tubao, information was received of enemy moving up coast road to join Tinio at Aringay.

"My force was too small to allow any concentration of the enemy, and we pushed on, leaving all foot-sore and tired-out Macabebes with a small guard at Tubao to wait and care for weary stragglers being brought up by the rear guard under Bell.

"On November 19 I sent word to General Lawton that 'I need additional forces, but cannot wait. A battalion of light infantry that can march rapidly without impedimenta should follow on my trail, with an officer in command who will push for all he is worth.'

"At dusk we struck the enemy's intrenchments and Batson gallantly carried them by assault. Quinlan and Hall with their companies waded the river in the face of a heavy fire: Chase dismounted, covering left flank and driving back a force evidently just arriving on our side of the river from the coast road. One Macabebe soldier was wounded and died the same night. Batson's left foot was shattered by a spent ball through the instep, a very sad and at this time a very grave misfortune, and one particularly disheartening to the Macabebes, who performed prodigious work under him.

"The enemy finding our troops crossing, fled from their upstream works. Some of the Macabebes were carried off their feet and the crossing was effected by the aid of fires built at different points. We pushed into Aringay in rear of the trenches made to defend the coast road. The night was very dark, and we knew nothing of these trenches or the force in them until morning, after they had escaped during the night. Quinlan had been knocked over by a spent ball but soon recovered. Lieutenant Bell and party, with sick and footsore men, arrived from Tubao, 6 miles distant, at

8 A. M. 20th, and I moved out immediately, leaving Bell and party to guard the sick and wounded.

“Between Aringay and Booang flag communication was gained with gunboat Samar, Ensign Mustin commanding. He was requested to open on the works at San Fernando at 2.30 P. M. At Booang, Wilder, of my staff, who had been placed in command of the Macabebes, took the road to Naguiliang.

“The insurgent battalions of Union and Benguet provinces had increased Aguinaldo’s strength to over 1,000. Part of this force had followed Aguinaldo and the remainder was with Tinio, going directly up the coast road. I overtook Chase as he neared San Fernando and witnessed the handsomest and neatest little fight of the campaign. A trench made with bamboo revetment and ditched in front extended from the foot of the mountain across road to cemetery wall. The approach was through an open rice field with no cover. Chase’s dismounted force numbered 37 troopers, and with these he charged up and over the works. As the enemy’s fire made it very uncomfortable around my flag, we all charged, carrying the led horses up against the works.

“As Chase and his men were scrambling over them, the horses were passed through an opening in rear of west terminus of works and in front of southeast corner of the cemetery wall. The narrow defile, 400 yards in length, leading into the town, was passed under a heavy fire from both sides, but the rush through by Chase and troopers, followed by the led horses at a trot, seemed to unnerve the enemy, as none of his fire was effective. The enemy kept up an annoying fire on Chase’s exhausted men from the hills beyond, until the Samar’s guns frightened them away.

“An insurgent officer captured some days afterwards stated that the force opposed to Chase at San Fernando numbered 300: 200 of this number occupied the works facing the sea, and Chase’s rapid entry into the rear of the town by the road, rendered their position untenable, and they fled without offering resistance: but of this fact we were not

aware until the rear of their column was seen on the distant hills.

“Early on the morning of the 21st, leaving Chase to hold San Fernando, I returned to Booang, and met Parker and Swigert, who had come up the coast road. Swigert had whipped the enemy and driven him out of St. Tomas early the same day on which Batson drove him out of Aringay.

“Captain Cunningham and his mounted scouts of Hare’s regiment, who came up with Parker, were left to occupy Booang, and with Swigert’s two troops I followed on Wilder’s trail. About 6 miles out we met Wilder returning with information that Aguinaldo had left two nights previous, but had not taken trail to Trinidad. Wilder had sent Lieutenant Lee Hall with his company of Macabebes over mountain trail from Naguiliang direct to San Fernando. Ordering Wilder and Swigert to return to Booang for the night, I hurried back to San Fernando from Booang, and arrived there at 11 p. m. Hall arrived about midnight.

“The situation was perplexing: my cavalry was crippled for want of shoes: the Macabebes were disheartened at the loss of their beloved leader, Batson, and many were sick and foot-sore.

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“On November 22 I sent word to General Wheaton that —

“‘Aguinaldo slept in Balauang, on the coast road, night of November 20: passed through Bangar 10 A. M. November 21. All information agrees that he is going to the province of Albra.

“‘My forces are much depleted and worn out. Aguinaldo has been playing hide and seek: one day in the mountains, the next day he, or some of his generals, on coast road. . . . Am sorry you found it necessary to recall Faison. The infantry force promised has not arrived. . . . Aguinaldo is an outlaw and a fugitive in the mountains and can be caught with fresh troops. If you can assist me in this matter in the way indicated, I don’t see how he can escape.’

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“‘Information given very positively says Aguinaldo has a force of 1,700 men with him in Abra. . . . I need additional cavalry force, as it may be able to get here in the shortest time. Infantry could be landed by boat at Darigayos, 4 miles south of this point. . . . I am of the opinion that Aguinaldo’s force is overestimated, but I do not want to sacrifice the lives of any of my men at the last moment, if it can be avoided. If this note reaches General Wheaton, I urgently request any assistance he may be able to give me. I also request that this despatch be rushed forward to General Lawton. . . .’

“On the 25th Swigert examined country around Namaspan, Balauang, and Bangar. Sergt. Aquilino Vasea, with two of his Macabebes on outpost duty, attacked a party of insurgents, killing 1 and capturing 1, also capturing four rifles and ammunition.

“The mass of the people in this section showed the strongest demonstration of friendship and welcome to us. They had been robbed by the insurgent commanders, and many of them feared that they would be robbed of what they had left by our troops. I sent back to the agent of the tobacco company, Don Benito Reynoldo, at San Fernando, and borrowed \$2,500 on my personal security, in order that cash might be paid for all supplies needed.

“It was learned here that Aguinaldo had been at Naguilang on his way to Benguet, but had changed his plan of escape in deference to the demands of his new provincial reinforcements. He then took a trail leading into Balauang, thence through Namacpacan and north on the coast road, intending to go to the province of Abra by way of Vigan.

“Tinio, with a retarding force of 600, was occupying and repairing trenches at Tagudin. A leading intelligent man of this community estimated the total forces with Aguinaldo, Tinio, Pilar, and Concepcion at 1,700, with 500 men more under Natividad in the Province of Abra. I thought at first that these numbers were exaggerated, but later on became fully satisfied they were not.

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“Aguinaldo and Tinio had separated at Candon, the former going by mountain trail southeast to Lepanto, leaving Pilar to fortify and hold the mountain pass in his rear, near Angaqui. A captured letter showed Aguinaldo in Angaqui the 28th, intending to go to Cervantes on the 29th. Tinio was going north to San Quintin to hold the Abra canyon against force moving up from Vigan.

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“The Abra has its source in central Lepanto, and thence flows almost due north to the centre of Abra, then a little south of west to Vigan. The range of mountains between this valley and the west coast valley can be crossed by only two difficult trails leading through strongly fortified passes. Pilar occupied one of these passes in the rear of Aguinaldo, and Tinio with a strong force occupied the other. Tinio’s continual demonstrations in our front made it evident that his object was to lead us away from following Aguinaldo. Counter demonstrations were made against Tinio by the cavalry.

“On the 30th March was sent on Aguinaldo’s trail, with the assurance that I would protect his rear against Tinio.”

#### D. MAJOR MARCH'S ACCOUNT.

Major March reports his encounter with Pilar’s forces in the Tila Pass as follows : \*

“Tila Pass is 4,440 feet high and the rise is extremely rapid. The trail winds up the Tila Mountains in a sharp zig-zag. The enemy had constructed a stone barricade across the trail at a point where it commanded the turns of the zigzag for a considerable distance. This barricade was loop holed for infantry fire and afforded head cover for the insurgents. On passing on beyond Lingey the advance was checked by a heavy fire from this barricade, which killed and wounded several men, without having its position revealed. I

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\* Report of Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, 1900, Part 4, page 331.

brought up the remainder of the command at double time, losing two men wounded during the run up. On arriving at the point, I located the insurgents' position with my glasses — their fire being entirely Mauser and smokeless powder — by the presence of the insurgent officer who showed himself freely and directed the fire. On pushing forward, the number of my men who were hit increased so rapidly that it was evident that the position could not be taken by a front attack, when the trail only allowed the men to pass one at a time. On the left of the barricade was a gorge several hundred feet deep. On its right, as we faced it, was a precipitous mountain which rose 1,500 feet above the trail. Across the gorge and to the left front of the barricade was a hill, which, while it did not permit of flank fire into the barricade, commanded the trail in its rear, and this point I occupied with ten sharpshooters in command of Sergeant-Major McDougall. He lost one man wounded in getting to the top, and when there rendered most effective assistance. I then ordered Lieutenant Tompkins to take his company (H) and proceeding back on the trail to ascend the slope of the mountain under cover of a slight ridge which struck the face of the mountain about 150 feet from the summit. From there he had a straight-up climb to the top, where the men pulled themselves up by twigs and by hand. The ascent took two hours, during which the enemy kept up an incessant and accurate fire, which they varied by rolling down stones on our heads. When Tompkins' men appeared upon the crest of the hills over their heads, he had the command of the two other trenches which were constructed in rear of the barricade, I have described, around a sharp turn in the trail, and which were also held by the insurgents. He opened fire upon them and I charged the first barricade at the same time, and rushed the enemy over the hill. We found eight dead bodies on the trail, and the bushes which grew at the edge of the gorge were broken and blood-stained where dead or wounded men fell through. Among the dead bodies was that of Gregorio del Pilar, the general commanding insurgent

forces. I have in my possession his shoulder straps; French field glasses, which gave the range of objects; official and private papers, and a mass of means of identification. He was also recognized personally by Mr. McCutcheon and Mr. Keene, two newspaper correspondents who had met him before. The insurgents' report of their loss in this fight is 52, given to me after I reached Cervantes. My loss was 2 killed and 9 wounded. I reached the summit at 4.30 P. M. and camped there for the night, finding at that point a large amount of rice, lard, etc., which had been abandoned by the insurgents and on which I subsisted my troops. In this engagement I also captured several Mausers and a large quantity of Mauser ammunition.

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"At Cervantes I learned that the force at Tila Pass was a picked force from Aguinaldo's body guard, and that it was wiped out of existence. Aguinaldo with his wife and two other women and a handful of men were living in a convent at Cervantes, perfectly secure in his belief that Tila Pass was an impregnable position. It was the insurgents' Thermopylæ. Upon learning of the death of Pilar, which news was brought in by runners across the hills at 5 P. M. of the same day, Aguinaldo hastily gathered together his effects, and with two of his women on horseback and his wife in a litter carried by Igorrotes, left the town at 10 o'clock P. M. I arrived the evening of the 3d and spent the 4th in resting the men and sifting evidence of his whereabouts. All large numbers of Spanish prisoners were abandoned in his flight, and from their tales and those of natives, I located him as passing through Cayan at 2 o'clock A. M. 3d instant. I set out at 6 A. M. on the 5th for Cayan, with a picked force of 100 officers and men who were the least exhausted by their long march and the fighting. The road begins immediately to ascend and goes straight up until a height of 9,000 feet is reached.

"Upon arriving at Cayan I was met by two staff officers of Gen. Venancio Concepcion, Aguinaldo's chief of staff, with a letter proposing an interview, with the suspension of hos-

tilities in view. I told his officers that there could be no suspension of hostilities, but that if the general and his staff wanted to come in and surrender I would guarantee them good treatment and would consent to their proposed interview at 3 P. M. He came in and surrendered and was sent to Cervantes under charge of a guard. A number of the men were now exhausted by the climb to Cayan, so I weeded out the command again and set out after Aguinaldo with 86 men. All this time I had been living on the country, paying or giving receipt for what I took. I now got into a country which produces very little besides yams, and in which the marching was extremely severe. However, I pushed on to Baguen, near Bontoc, where I found natives hostile to Aguinaldo, and learned that he had gone on through the town of Bontoc to Tuluben, evidently making for Ban-aueg and the road to Bayambang, three days before. He was gaining on me with fresh ponies and bearers and with his party unencumbered. I therefore rounded up the Spanish prisoners throughout the region and returned to Cervantes."

#### E. MR. McCUTCHEON'S ACCOUNT.

Mr. John T. McCutcheon, the newspaper correspondent referred to above, has been so strongly indorsed as a trustworthy witness,\* that it seems proper to include his writings among the "authentic publications" from which this series of pamphlets are compiled. He wrote a stirring account of the fight at Tila Pass and the pursuit of Aguinaldo (originally published in the *Chicago Record* and since republished by

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\* The following letter to one of the editors from the well-known correspondent, Mr. John F. Bass, gives some idea of Mr. McCutcheon's standing among his fellow workers:

"I consider Mr. McCutcheon one of the most impartial and reliable newspaper men that I have ever met. He is unprejudiced and I strongly recommend his work as absolutely trustworthy, sane and not in the least hysterical. You could not do better than quote him. I know of no other man of whom I could say as much."



the *Record* in pamphlet form) from which we quote the following dramatic incident:\*

"Gen. Gregorio del Pilar was the last man to fall. He was striving to escape up the trail and had already received a wound in the shoulder. A native was holding his horse for him and just as he was preparing to mount a Krag-Jorgensen bullet caught him in the neck, and passing through came out just below his mouth. The men of Company E, rushing up the trail, caught the native, who was endeavoring to secure the papers which the general had in his pockets, and a moment later captured the horse.

"At that time no one knew who the dead man was, but from his uniform and insignia they judged that he was an officer of high rank. The souvenir fiend was at once at work and the body was stripped of everything of value from the diamond ring to the boots. A pair of handsome field glasses with an attachment which determined the ranges for the riflemen was turned over to Captain Jenkinson by one of the men. Three little gold locketts hung around his neck, one with an enamel representation of a saint on it, another a purely ornamental one, and the last a small Agnus Dei. He wore silver spurs, shoulder straps of gold and a new Khaki suit such as all the higher Filipino officers wear. He carried no sword. In one of his pockets was an American \$20 gold piece, which he had shown me when he was in Manila with a peace embassy some months before.

"The articles of most importance and interest, however, were documents which he had in his pockets. Of these there were many, all of which were turned over to Major March. Some were muster rolls, some were letters and instructions from Aguinaldo, one was a note from Aguinaldo which had been brought by the native to Pilar during the fight. When the native was searched the receipt for this note was found, signed by Pilar, and tucked away in his hat. Many letters were found, most of them from his sweetheart, Dolores Jose, who lived in Dagupan. A handkerchief bearing her name was also found in his pocket. One letter was

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\* Chicago *Record's* Stories of Filipino Warfare, page 14.

found from the president of Lingay and gave the exact number of soldiers in March's command. Pilar's diary, which ran from November 19 on to the day of his death, was of remarkable interest, for it detailed many things regarding the wild flight of himself and Aguinaldo's party up the coast. The last words written in it were pathetic and indicated something of the noble character of the man. The passage, which was written only a few minutes previously, while the fight was on and while death even then was before him, said: 'I am holding a difficult position against desperate odds, but I will gladly die for my beloved country.'

"Pilar alive and in command, shooting down good Americans, was one thing, but Pilar lying in that silent mountain trail, his body half denuded of its clothes, and his young, handsome, boyish face discolored with the blood which saturated his blouse and stained the earth, was another thing. We could not help but feel admiration for his gallant fight, and sorrow for the sweetheart whom he left behind. The diary was dedicated to the girl, and I have since learned that he was to have married her in Dagupan about two weeks before. But the Americans came too soon. Instead of wedding bells there sounded the bugle calls of the foe and he was hurriedly ordered to accompany his chief, Aguinaldo, on that hasty retreat to the mountains. The marriage was postponed, and he carried out his orders by leaving for the north.

"Pilar was one of the best types of the Filipino soldier. He was only 23 years old, but he had been through the whole campaign in his capacity as brigadier-general. It was he who commanded the forces at Quingua the day that Col. Stotsenberg was killed, and it may be remembered that the engagement that day was one of the most bloody and desperate that has occurred on the island. He was a handsome boy, and was known as one of the Filipinos who were actuated by honestly patriotic motives, and who fought because they believed they were fighting in the right and not for personal gain or ambition.

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"When passing the scene of the fight at Tilar Pass [a few days later, when the pursuit of Aguinaldo had been abandoned], the prisoners were intensely interested in all the details, and bared their heads reverently when they rode by the patch of fresh gravel that marked where Gen. Pilar lay.

"'Is n't the revolution about over?' I asked of General Concepcion.

"'Ah, you think it is, but it is n't,' he replied. 'You now have disrupted the army and scattered it far and wide. You have some of the leaders in prison and your troops occupy the whole northern country. But how many rifles have you captured? On Feb. 4th, 1899, we had an army of 22,000 men with rifles. We have received many more arms since then. The Americans have not captured 3,000 of these arms. The rest are hidden. We have our commanders in the very districts occupied by your troops. The muster rolls are being kept up although the army is now in white clothes and is peaceably working at their homes. When Aguinaldo left Tarlac he advised his men to return to their homes, hide their rifles and at a later time be prepared to answer a call to arms. When you've got the arms, then, and only then, will the revolution be over.'"

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\* *Chicago Record's* Stories of Filipino Warfare, page 27.

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